Category Archives: International

March 8 protest

On International Women’s Day, women were at the forefront of the fight against the Islamic regime, writes Tina Becker

On International Women’s Day, around 100 people gathered outside the Iranian embassy in London to protest against the repression of women in Iran. Organised by the March 8 Women’s Organisation (Iran-Afghanistan), they heard a range of female speakers, who demanded an end to the Islamic regime.

No wonder that there was not a green scarf in sight. “Moussavi and his supporters are part of the Islamic regime. But we are with those women in Iran who want more than just a few reforms. We want the overthrow of the entire regime,” said Yassamine Mather, chair of Hands Off the People of Iran, which supported the event.

International Women’s Day, which was established on the initiative of Clara Zetkin and the Second International in 1910, has always focused not just on the suffering of women – but their fightback, too. And who can deny that women in Iran have to struggle against more enemies than most of us? Not only do they face the general patriarchal prejudices that all women do. They have also been at the forefront of the fight against the Islamic regime. After all, one of the first actions of the theocracy after the 1979 revolution was to force all women to wear the hijab.

But women also bear the main brunt of imperialist intervention in the country – be it in the form of sanctions or the threat of direct military intervention. “One just has to look at Iraq and Afghanistan to see how the rights of women have been rolled back since the occupation,” said Leila Parnia, the main organiser of the event.

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Hands Off the People of Iran: Week of action (February 13-20 2010)

Report of Hands Off the People of Iran AGM

The following report is by Mark Harrison of The Commune group

Saturday 28th November saw 50-odd people congregate in central London for the 2009 Annual General Meeting of the Hands Off The People of Iran campaign. Being a internationalist socialist campaign this gave oneself the chance to mix with some of the more principled elements of the British left, from class struggle anarchists to the LRC.

The day was opened by a report from Hopi secretary Mark Fischer of the CPGB, he explained that the protest movement emerging this summer around the fraudulent elections had vindicated the organisation’s position. He also attacked the leadership of the Stop The War Coalition for continuing to bar Hopi from affiliation due to our “working class common sense” position of opposing both imperialism and the theocratic regime. In June Hopi approached both SPEW and the SWP for a joint solidarity drive but received no response.

Following the June elections the SWP made one of their characteristically cumbersome shifts in position and now seemingly uncritically supports the Green movement (see Socialist Worker Issue 2156, “People power rocks Iran”). However, they tarnish the meaning of socialism less than the Stalinist George Galloway who appeared on Iranian state television shamelessly defending Ahmadinejad’s government and attacking enemies of the ‘Islamic Revolution’.

The second half of comrade Fischer’s presentation included campaigning priorities for the next 12 months: he bemoaned that although we have strengthened links with dissidents within Iran and the Hopi vs LRC cricket match showed the untapped potential for us to explore, our activist base is the same as last year and we have failed to make any significant breakthrough with trade union affiliations. He ended by suggesting that the employment of a part-timer would help fix these problems.

Speaking from the floor, Charlie Pottins (Jewish Socialists Group) and Andrew Coates said they were disappointed that not enough Hopi supporters were attending demonstrations outside the Iranian embassy as this would be an ideal opportunity to spread our message. Tina Becker commented that although she would welcome the suggestion of a part-timer, she doubted that enough money would be available to pay one. Comrade Becker also mentioned the campaign’s attempts to have its voice heard in a wider a wider selection of media: the piece in Red Pepper was the most viewed on their website for a whole month. However attempts to contact The Guardian and The Independent failed to yield any response.

The next session was entitled ‘Imperialism’s need for conflict and the situation in the Middle East’ with Mike Macnair and Moshé Machover. Comrade Macnair (CPGB) demonstrated using historical examples how capitalism required a ‘top dog’ wheather it be The Netherlands, Britain or America due to the needs of credit money and a central bank. He also claimed that American imperialism is in terminal decline and compared the Vietnam war to the Crimea.

Comrade Machover (founder of the Israeli socialist organisation Matzpen) explained that even if Barack Obama wanted to take a more peaceful turn in US foreign policy this would not happen as he is being constantly hounded by the American right and members of this own party. The comrade warned of the growing threat of war. Benny Morris, one of the ‘New Historians’ has been in the media recently justifying an attack on Iran – this could have the gravest of consequences. Moshé Machover brought his speech to a close by moving his motion, ‘For a Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons and other WMDs’.

An amendment from Tina Becker was passed which deleted the demand for “effective democratic international supervision” for the decommissioning of nuclear weapons as this could be misread to mean the United Nations. Peter Manson of the CPGB proposed an amendment to state that Hopi is against a ‘mullahs’ bomb’. Some criticised this phrasing, and the manner in which it was proposed – as a reaction to criticism by the Trotskyist group AWL – however, an amendment by Ben Lewis (CPGB) and David Broder (The Commune) stating unequivocal opposition to any development of nuclear weapons in Iran was passed by conference.

Gerry Downing (Socialist Fight) opposed the motion on the grounds that an Iranian nuclear weapon could be used to dissuade an American or Israeli attack and this could become a ‘workers’ bomb’ in the future, the comrade continued that the only reason that the Western world did not launch a nuclear attack on the USSR was due to its own nuclear capabilities. Jack Conrad (CPGB) defended the motion by stating there can be no such thing as this ‘workers’ bomb’ if it is intended to destroy other workers. Moreover, the Soviet Union was not able to hit mainland American until the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The motion was overwhelmingly passed.

Next came elections to the new steering committee, it was decided as only 11 candidates were standing they should all be elected unless anyone was opposed or wished to stand themselves. One comrade questioned the re-election of Stuart King as he was not present and the comrade also questioned Permanent Revolution’s commitment to Hopi, however the record of Stuart and of PR was defended by a majority of those present. The CPGB now hold four out of the positions on the steering committee although I would reject the notion of Hopi being a Weekly Worker front.

After lunch Marsha-Jane Thompson of the LRC read out a message of support from John McDonnell MP which received a round of applause. Comrade Thompson chaired the session lead by Cyrus Bina who attacked the idea of Iranian demonstrators mostly coming from the middle classes as 3 million people had been on the streets at one point. He also pointed out that sanctions are often a precursor to war and hit the country’s poorest the hardest, as was seen in Iraq from 1990 to 2003 – Hussein and his gang still lived in comfort whilst an estimated 500,000 lives were needlessly lost due to sanctions. (See Unicef reports)

Heading into the final session Iranian exile and Hopi chair Yassamine Mather spoke on the activity of the Iranian workers’ movement since June and moved a motion opposing sanctions which was passed unanimously. As was a motion from Ben Lewis (CPGB) which called for a day of solidarity with Iranian workers.

The final piece of business of the afternoon was a motion entitled ‘No to state murders’ moved by Charlie Pottins. On the 11th of November, Ehsa Fattahian, a Kurdish socialist was killed by the Islamic Republic. Pottins called for workers to oppose the repressive nature of the Iranian regime and the oppression of national minorities like the Kurds. The motion also attacked the Iranian state for becoming a platform for Holocaust deniers as well as refuting capitalist propaganda which compares the Islamicist regime with Hitler’s fascism. I voted for an amendment moved by Gerry Downing which called for a re-wording of the phrase ‘self-determination for all.’ However this amendment was defeated.

I considered the day a success, however it is worrying that we cannot attract more support for our cause.

Is it the oil, stupid?

Cyrus BinaTo say that oil figures prominently in the Middle East is to state the obvious. However, does this mean that the politics of imperialism in the region should be solely or mainly explained through attempts to gain control over oilfields and pipelines? That has certainly been the approach of much of the left in Britain and elsewhere. Noted US-based academic Cyrus Bina, author of The economics of the oil crisis, disagrees with such crude simplifications. Having studied the oil industry, international relations and global economics for many years, he has developed a sophisticated Marxist theory of the oil crisis, oil rent, and monopoly and competition in the oil industry. Here, in this short, representative, article, first published in 2004, he makes a convincing case that the US under George W Bush was not concerned with obtaining direct control over oilfields.1 With the ongoing US-UK campaign to impose tougher sanctions on Iran, including its huge oil industry, plans for regime change brought about from above and, failing that, a devastating military strike, the left urgently needs to correct past mistakes. Cyrus Bina is about to embark on a speaking tour of Britain that will include meetings in Manchester, Glasgow and London. In particular he will be addressing the November 28 annual general meeting of Hands Off the People of Iran

Saddam Hussein was an ideal enemy and Iraq was an easy target. Iraq had already lost nearly two thirds of its forces and more than 80% of its infrastructure and civil society in the 1990-91 Gulf War and, if that was not enough, it was subjected to frequent American and British bombings, along with nearly 12 years of stringent sanctions. The war against a weak symbolic enemy seemed inevitable.2

In the May 12 2003 issue of The Nation, there appeared a tiny piece entitled, ‘It’s the oil, stupid’, by Michael T Klare, who – like much of the majority of the popular left – is obsessed with oil in connection with the deceitful invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration.

To be sure, the motivation of the Cheney-Wolfowitz gang and the impeachable actions of the president himself all point in the direction of personal gain. Similarly, the fact of the transfer of tens of billions of dollars from the public coffers to the willing hands of a handful of favourite companies that were readily chosen as the beneficiary of this destructive creation is beyond dispute. Yet, to be worthy of analysis, one needs to be brave enough to go beyond surface phenomena in order to grasp the complexities associated with deeper epochal understanding of this bizarre tragedy.

Writers like Klare and George Caffentzis (the latter, incidentally, holds that oil is a “metaphysical” commodity) should realise that their oil scenario, firstly, ignores the analytical periodisation of oil history into: (a) the cartelisation of oil; (b) the transitional period of 1950-72; and (c) the globalisation of the entire oil industry since the mid-1970s. Secondly, it overlooks the distinction between ‘administrative pricing’ and value theoretic price formation. Thirdly, it neglects the nature of property relations, formation of differential oil rents, and character of the Organisation of Oil-Exporting Countries (Opec) in the (post-1974) globalisation of oil. Fourthly, it discounts the pivotal role of the least productive US oilfields that is key to the worldwide pricing of oil. Fifthly, it fails to recognise that Opec prices are constrained by worldwide competitive spot (oil) prices, and thus Opec oil rents are subject to global competition. And finally their oil scenario fails to realise that the unqualified usage of words, such as ‘access’, ‘dependency’ and ‘control’, in the context of a globalised oil industry, is anachronistic.3

Hegemony and mediation

The concept of hegemony is indivisible and ‘organic’ in respect to its constituent economic, political and ideological counterparts. And it is due to the consensual internal dynamics and intrinsic ideological power of the whole that one can exert minimal external and antagonistic power projection. This, in a broad measure, defines hegemony and its relevance to international relations, for instance, during the rise and fall of Pax Americana (1945-79). Gramsci, nevertheless, focuses on the “organic intellectuals” and examines their relationship with the “world of production” mediated through the complex intricacies of “civil society” and “political society”.4

Hegemony, in my view, has four characteristics. It must be: (a) organically consensual; (b) internally driven; (c) historically endowed; and (d) institutionally mediating. The focus here is upon the rise and fall of Pax Americana, a historically specific inter-state transnational system that rose after 1945 and fell in the late 1970s. The matter of hegemony and hegemonic structure is the mutual characteristic of the system as a whole, and not a separate property of the hegemon. Therefore, given the demise of Pax Americana, the claim of American hegemony remains baseless.

The epochal measure of hegemony

In order to see the concrete manifestation of hegemony in the then-ascendant Pax Americana,5 one has to focus on the application of the (tripartite) ‘doctrine of global containment’ after World War II. This doctrine embodied: (a) the containment of the Soviet Union; (b) the containment of democratic/nationalist movements in the ‘third world’; and (c) the containment, cooption and moulding of the social, political and intellectual atmosphere in the United States.6

The example of the first containment is the forceful confinement of the Soviets behind the ‘iron curtain’ and imposition of cold war. The cold war was a multidimensional hegemonic phenomenon, spanning the economy, polity and the entire realm of culture and ideology worldwide.

Evidence of the second type of containment is the declaration of an anti-colonial policy, on the one hand, and subversion of the democratic national movements in the ‘third world’, on the other. This doctrine often led to covert campaigns and coup d’etats that brought a number of dictatorial regimes to power whose contradictory material existence and discursive mirror image have, nevertheless, become an embodiment of Pax Americana itself.7 At the same time, America’s deliberate attempt at the speedy economic transformation of these social formations – for instance, via the introduction and forceful implementation of universal land reform programmes – has led to their hasty inclusion within the capitalist sphere of transnational exploitation and transnational markets.

Finally, the third containment strategy was implemented in terms of US domestic thought control and marginalisation of independent and militant institutions and labour unions within America’s ‘civil society’. Thus, historically, the American state smashed the militant labour unions and political and professional institutions of the left in order to universalise a ‘hegemonic model’ of intellectual emulation that shifted the entire American political spectrum significantly to the reactionary right. McCarthyism was just the tip of the iceberg in this regard.8 Here, underpinning social relations, on the one hand, and the mediating economic, political and ideological institutions, on the other hand, have reflected the measure of hegemony embedded in this system.

At a more concrete level, since the 1970s, it is through the particular historical relationship of state and the manifold social, political and economic integration and disintegration vis-à-vis transnational capital that the US-dominated hierarchy of Pax Americana and thus American hegemony has come to an end. Yet during the ‘golden age’, Soviet containment had its own manifold objectives that proved successful. The containment of democracy and independence in the third world chunk of Pax Americana had, nonetheless, left some degree of formal national sovereignty. And post-war containment of people’s political thought and action in US domestic ‘civil society’ had not led to the establishment of a police state with arbitrary, pre-emptive and systemic totalitarian objectives, if not practices.

In December 2001, the Bush administration unveiled its ‘National strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction’.9 The Bush administration used the unfortunate events of September 11 2001 as a convenient cover in order to advance toward its ‘permanent war’ policy.10 This was a formal annunciation of the Doctrine of pre-emption, a fundamental policy break from the Doctrine of containment, as follows:

“An effective strategy for countering WMD [weapons of mass destruction], including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the national security strategy of the United States of America. As with the war on terrorism [ie, invasion of Afghanistan, etc], our strategy for homeland security, and our new concept of deterrence, the US approach to combat WMD represents a fundamental change from the past ….

“Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, US military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through pre-emptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are used” (emphasis added).11

The mismeasure of ‘blood for oil’

Institutionally, the traditional petroleum cartels must be viewed as a precursor to, and not a substitute for, the highly developed contemporary global oil market. Today’s oil sector is globally structured and competitive.12

Here, contrary to the bourgeois reading of the term, competition is neither perfect nor imperfect. It rather reflects the coercive aspect of concentration and centralisation of capital in the oil industry. Yet, the myth of the war-for-oil scenario is hard to resist.

On the right, in an interview, James Schlesinger remarked: “The United States [Bush, the father] has gone to war now, and the American people presume this will lead to a secure oil supply. As a society we have made a choice to secure access to oil by military means. The alternative is to become independent to a large degree of that secure access.”13 On the left, Michael Klare declared: “Two key concerns underlie the administration’s [Bush, the son] thinking: First, the United States is becoming dangerously dependent on imported petroleum to meet its daily energy requirements, and second, Iraq possesses the world’s largest reserves of untapped petroleum after Saudi Arabia.”14

Thus, the positions of the right and the left on the cause of these wars are remarkably identical. The question is, why? Is it because of the correctness of rightwing neoclassical theory in revealing the universal truth? Or is it because of the fallacious economic ideology that is uncritically accepted by the theoryless and clueless left?

Finally, the Indian leftist electronic journal Aspects of India’s economy devoted its entire December 2002 double-issue to ‘What is behind the invasion of Iraq’.15 The authors conclude, among other things, that the attempted conversion of oil revenues from the US dollar to the euro prompted the invasion of Iraq by United States. As Krugman pointed out in a short note, any possible shift from the US dollar to the euro on the part of Opec will result in a “small change”.16

However, the fly-by-night authors do not lose any opportunity to grasp this straw in the midst of dreadful confusion. The globalisation of oil since the mid-1970s has rendered the sui generis categories of ‘access’ and ‘dependency’ meaningless.17 Based on my value-theoretic framework, I distinguish between what is ‘organic’ and what is ‘conjectural’ in the pricing of oil. To be sure, the price of production of the highly explored oilfields within the US lower 48 states is the global centre of gravity of oil prices everywhere. As a result, in competition, the more productive oilfields in the world are potentially able to collect additional profits in terms of oil rents.

Let us look at a simple exercise, attempting the calculation of the value of all Iraqi proven oil reserves in today’s prices.18 Given the Iraqi proven oil reserves of nearly 110 billion barrels, in two separate assumptions, let us assume two alternative production schedules of 2.5 and 5 million daily barrels, as follows:

If the rate of utilisation of these reserves, ceteris paribus, will be set at 2.5 and 5 million average daily barrels, these oil reserves would be exhausted within nearly 120 years and 60 years, respectively. Accordingly, our respective annual production schedules are:
1. (2.5 x 365 = 912.5) 912.5 million annual barrels
2. (5 x 365 = 1,825) 1,825 million annual barrels.

Assuming $20 per barrel for the price of Iraqi oil (viz the 1990s average market price) and about $10 for the Persian Gulf differential oil rent.19

Let us further assume:
1. an 8% real discount rate;
2. a 3% annual inflation rate;
3. a 3% annual growth rate of addition to the proven reserves.

Scenario 1

1. The assumption of 2.5 million daily barrels: Given an annual production volume of 912.5 million barrels within 120 years and $10 of differential oil rent per barrel, the value of differential oil rents for 120 years is as follows:
912.5 million x 120 = 109.5 billion barrels
109.5 billion x $10 = $1.095 trillion

Given an 8% annual discount rate, a 3% annual rate inflation and a 3% annual growth rate of addition to proven reserves, we have applicable rate of discount of 8%. Thus, the present value of $1.095 trillion at 8% discount rate to be received in a lump sum after 120 years is $106.8 million.

2. The assumption of five million daily barrels: Given an annual production volume of 1,825 million barrels within 60 years and a $10 differential oil rent per barrel, the value of differential oil rents at the end of 60 years is as follows:
1,825 million x 60 = 109.5 billion barrels
109.5 billion x $10 = $1.095 trillion

Given an 8% annual discount rate, a 3% annual rate inflation and a 3% annual growth rate of addition to the proven reserves, we would have applicable rate of discount of 8%. Thus, present value of $1.095 trillion at 8% discount rate to be received in lump sum after 60 years is $10.81 billion.

Based upon the second, much larger figure of the two, the price tag for differential oil rents in Iraq is slightly less than $11 billion. Now, let us assume that the Iraqi oil reserves are underestimated: say, that they are five times the reported figures. Thus, ceteris paribus, one would arrive at $11 billion x 5 = $55 billion. Now, let us double our reasonable figure of $10 for differential rent per barrel. Again, we would never arrive at a figure much larger than $110 billion for the present value of all differential oil rents to be paid to the Iraqis. In other words, the ‘Iraqi oil price tag’ does not exceed $110 billion to be received in lump sum at the end of the period. This is indeed chump change, given the staggering costs associated with prosecuting the war and the unanticipated financial and incalculable human costs of the occupation of Iraq.

Scenario 2

Let us further assume that the proceeds from differential oil rents in Iraq will be received on an annual basis: say, for 55 years. In other words, assume that the Bush administration and its future successors are able to invent a pill that tranquillises not only the people of Iraq, but also the people of the entire world in order to calmly and comfortably steal the Iraqi oil rents for 55 years, till 2058. Now we need to calculate the summation of the present value of annuitised annual Iraqi oil rents for the period of 55 years. This scenario is more realistic, since the payments of oil rents are made on an annual basis. Again, for the sake of argument, we have chosen a much larger average figure of 5 million daily barrels, assuming a very optimistic production schedule:
5 million x 365 = 1.825 billion annual barrels
1.825 billion x $10 = $18.25 billion

The present value of $18.250 billion annual payment, to be paid for 55 consecutive years is equal to $224.8 billion.

According to the Nordhaus estimates, the direct and indirect costs of forceful occupation of Iraq would range somewhere between $120 billion and $1.6 trillion over a 10-year period.20 Should my estimated value of Iraqi oil warrant such a huge undertaking? As we can see, the reductionist view of ‘no blood for oil’ is hardly an answer to the complex objective forces that – despite the misleading intention of new US foreign policy – are underlying the upheavals of present global polity. Rather such misleading intention, and prior and subsequent actions on the part of the US government, are readily explicable by the underlying epochal forces that so irreversibly led to America’s loss of hegemony, on the one hand, and American refusal to accept it gracefully, on the other hand.

This is the main and real cause of the new world disorder rather than this ad hoc ‘oil scenario’ that the popular left harps on about.

Notes

  1. This article originally appeared in Union for Radical Political Economics Newsletter of spring 2004. See www.urpe.org/index.html
  2. See, for instance, a neo-conservative view by Kenneth Adelman: ‘Cakewalk in Iraq’, The Washington Post February 13 2002.
  3. For theoretical underpinnings see C Bina The economics of the oil crisis New York 1985.
  4. A Gramsci The prison notebooks New York1971, p161.
  5. See R Steel Pax Americana New York 1977.
  6. See GF Kennan Memoirs: 1925-1950 Boston 1967.
  7. The 1953 and 1954 CIA coups against Mossadegh and Arbenz are but the two prime examples.
  8. See MB Levin Political hysteria in America: the democratic capacity for repression New York 1971.
  9. One has to distinguish between epochal and temporal reflections of the Bush administration.
  10. The Wolfowitz-Berle neo-conservative project of permanent war, particularly for ‘redrawing’ the map of the Middle East, was formulated long before September 11 2001.
  11. White House The national security strategy of the United States of America September 17 2002, pp1,3.
  12. Here competition is defined in Marxian terms.
  13. J Schlesinger, interview: ‘Will war yield oil security?’ Challenge March-April 1991.
  14. MT Klare, ‘Oiling the wheels of war’ The Nation October 7 2002. As a corollary, the ‘necessity’ of oil exploration from Alaska’s wildlife can also be justified by such arguments.
  15. ‘Behind the invasion of Iraq’ Aspects of India’s economy No33-34, December 2002.
  16. See P Krugman, ‘Nothing for money’, March 14 2003: www.wwsprinceton.edu/~pkrugman/oildollar.html
  17. MT Klare, ‘Oiling the wheels of war’ The Nation October 7 2002.
  18. This is a rough exercise just for the sake of illustration and approximation of the order of magnitude of Iraqi oil rents. One or two points in the discount rate or inflation rate would not make a significant difference in the basic argument. The figure of $224.8 billion is for 55 consecutive years. If the occupation of Iraq is assumed to be for a 10-year period or so, then a fraction of this figure will be relevant, which in turn will be even much smaller in magnitude than the commonly estimated cost of US war and occupation of Iraq.
  19. See C Bina The economics of the oil crisis New York 1985.
  20. WD Nordhaus, ‘Iraq: the economic consequences of war’ New York Review of Books Vol 49 (19), December 5 2002.

Soviet ‘planning’ and bolt-on democracy

The Socialist Party in England and Wales’ Socialism event in London had a session on Stalinism’s collapse. Mark Fischer points out what it represents for Marxists

Socialist Party general secretary Peter Taaffe made a number of rather dubious claims in his competently delivered session entitled ‘Why did Stalinism collapse in the Soviet Union – what have the consequences been?’

Prominent amongst these was the assertion that his was “the only organisation” that recognised that the collapse of the Soviet Union – and in particular, the ignominious manner of its defeat – represented an important “ideological defeat” for the left as a whole that precipitated a rightwing global offensive on working class gains. He used the Labour Party as an especially pertinent example, correctly pinpointing the removal of clause four and growing confidence of the right as a political consequence of the collapse of Stalinism.

He did not even qualify this – manifestly untrue – statement about the ‘unique’ position of his organisation by admitting that the Socialist Party had arrived at it in hindsight. This was, after all, the same Peter Taaffe who told us in 1989 that talk of “capitalist restoration” was a “chimera” (Militant July 21 1989). Indeed, he once thought that “Gorbachev’s coming to power signified the beginning of the political revolution” and would define the coming decade as the “red 90s” (Militant January 19 1990). A tad on the over-optimistic side, I’m sure even comrade Taaffe would now concede.

He was not alone in this confusion, of course. Practically the entire Trotskyist/Trotskyoid left mechanically insisted that there were only two possibilities open to societies such as the USSR. There “will either be totalitarian rule under a one-party state” (i.e. the status quo) “or there will be control of industry and state by the workers” (i.e. a healthy workers’ state – Ted Grant, writing in Militant October 3 1980). Ironically, this was quoted as an example of how “Militant was absolutely correct and born out by events” in the May 1989 introduction to Grant’s selected works, The unbroken thread.

In vivid contrast, our organisation – despite its very different evaluation of the nature of bureaucratic socialism in those days – was able to point to the obvious fact that “in these countries capitalism is being restored with the consent of the broad mass of the population and that for the full-blown reintroduction of capitalism there exists no necessity for violently smashing the existing state” (editorial The Leninist April 1 1990). To halt this process, we called for “a real political revolution” in the USSR, not the counterrevolutionary farce headed by Gorbachev (The Leninist November 21 1987) – a simple fact that belies comrade Taaffe’s assertion in his reply to remarks I made during the discussion that it was our now highly critical attitude to the Stalinist states that was retrospective and that “no wing” of the Communist Party had made these sorts of criticisms at the time.

I decided not to explore these rather involved questions in my five-minute contribution to the discussion. Instead, I took issue with a much more straightforward difference – the notion that collapse of Stalinism equated with the “liquidation of planned economies”, an historical ‘gain’ of the revolution that had been preserved despite the bureaucratic excrescences.

I pointed out that planning for Marxists was not simply target-setting – it must have a genuine social content. Specifically, the democratic formulation of that plan by the direct producers themselves. The farcical nature of bureaucratic ‘planning’ in the USSR was perfectly illustrated in the five-year plans, when Stalin and Molotov arbitrarily leapfrogged one crazily unrealistic set of targets by another, with no concern for equilibrium or balance in the economy, nor indeed for genuine utility of the outputs.

Comrade Taaffe would later reply to discussion and underline that the “vital issues” that were raised as we endeavour to “understand Stalinism” would have a “direct bearing on our coming struggles”. This was not simply relevant to regimes such as Venezuela and its creeping Bonapartist authoritarianism, he suggested, but also because Stalin would be “used as a scarecrow to frighten new generations away from socialism”.

Absolutely. And the fact that SPEW comrades – including Peter Taaffe himself – can still see the unviable monstrosity of the USSR as an “anticipation from an economic point of view” of the society of the future is a pretty frightening prospect in itself. Summing up, the comrade told the meeting that what existed in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe was “planning in a rudimentary form” (although quite why and how it “disintegrated” in the 1980s he did not elaborate) and, even in this primitive form, the mass of simple “empirical evidence” countered my claim about the absence of planning. I actually got quite nostalgic when comrade Taaffe cited achievements such as Sputnik and other SPEWers talked of the rights enjoyed by Soviet citizens to “a home, a job, a decent health service” – it was like being in a CPGB meeting from the mid-70s again.

One comrade put it particularly crudely. After listing all the economic advantages conferred on the population by even bureaucratic ‘planning’, he conceded “the bit that was missing was democracy”.

The notion that democracy is a desirable, but non-essential bolt-on in a workers’ state underlines that SPEW – in common with much of the rest of the left – in practice has a top-down, paternalistic view of socialism. Many of the comrades were reduced to citing the catastrophic collapse in living standards that followed the counterrevolutions as circumstantial evidence of the partially progressive nature of these regimes. Living standards are hardly an irrelevance, but the key when we evaluate such societies should be the levels of proletarian consciousness and organisation, its room for independent initiative and the genuine workers’ control that can be observed. It simply is not Marxism to work backwards from the growth in pig iron production or even – an example closer to home – the number of council houses put up in Liverpool and extrapolate from this dull “empirical evidence” that what we have in front of us is a working class entity in any meaningful sense.

Joining a rogues’ gallery – Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize

Barack Obama is presiding over an escalation of military action in Afghanistan. Despite that, he is a hero for the liberal bourgeoisie, writes James Turley

obama.phpFairly soon after Barack Obama’s victory in last year’s presidential elections, there appeared an amusing little website called Bad Paintings of Barack Obama,1 which randomly flashes up canvasses of dubious merit – a few paranoiac and hostile, the vast majority rapturously enthusiastic – all featuring the charismatic president.

Last week, one could be forgiven for thinking that this glut of kitsch fantasy art had somehow bled into reality, Who framed Roger Rabbit?-style. Obama – commander in chief, lest we forget, of a military presently engaged in a bloody and apparently endless war in Afghanistan, with whom the buck stops over unmanned drone killings, election-rigging and incursions into Pakistan – is the latest recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

It would be one thing, of course, if Obama had made serious efforts to end, or even scale down, America’s involvement in Afghanistan – but the reverse, of course, is true: he went to the polls with the message that Iraq was “the wrong war”, whereas Afghanistan was winnable and should indeed be won. Such a view was briefly fashionable, as the American and British militaries began to withdraw from Iraq, with attention focused on the Afghan disaster instead. Now, it is clear that optimism over Afghanistan was a fantasy – but it is a fantasy that has left Obama committed to scaling up America’s commitment in that battered country.

The ostensible reason for the award, unsurprisingly, is unconnected with the bloodbath that renders it in any case farcical – Obama is to be rewarded for “his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples”. Those watching the president closely as he wrangled somewhat feebly over the content of health policy and attempted to manage an international recession in the interests of finance capital might ask themselves, ‘Exactly what extraordinary efforts are these?’

Well, let us turn to the Nobel committee for an answer: “Obama has as president created a new climate in international politics. Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play. Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts. The vision of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations. Thanks to Obama’s initiative, the USA is now playing a more constructive role in meeting the great climatic challenges the world is confronting. Democracy and human rights are to be strengthened.”2

Inasmuch as this represents a soup of stale platitudes, it is almost appropriate – after all, if there is one thing Obama is not short of, it is uplifting banalities. Exactly what is this “more constructive role” over climate change? In what sense can somebody happy to maintain an enormous nuclear arsenal be commended for his commitment to disarmament? At least he is the first president to tout “democracy and human rights” since … well, the last president (admittedly he is a little more rhetorically convincing on the issue).

The icing on the comedy cake is, of course, the timing. Obama has been in office for about nine months – and they have not been particularly easy. His gifts as a speaker, for projecting sincerity and inspiring devotion among millions, cannot be doubted. But that was about the only thing that could not be doubted at the time nominations closed on February 1 – a whopping 12 days after Obama was sworn in.

Who are the bright sparks behind this decision? Ultimately, the blame rests with the Scandinavian establishment – the peace prize portfolio is the responsibility of the Norwegian Nobel Committee (all the other prizes are awarded by Swedish bodies), which is selected by the Norwegian parliament, the Storting. As is customary, the make-up of the five-strong committee reflects the make-up of the Storting – this year, that means two members of the Labour Party and one each from the Socialist Left, Progress and Conservative parties. That is supposedly a fairly broad spectrum of opinion, from the former ‘official communists’ of the Socialist Left to the populist Thatcherites of Progress – yet apparently the decision was unanimous.

The peace prize was established in 1901, along with all the other Nobel prizes (barring the semi-detached economics award, founded in 1969 by the Swedish central bank). Alfred Nobel had been one of Sweden’s most prominent scientists and inventors – he is most celebrated for his invention of dynamite. The military applications of his invention did not escape notice at the time, and Nobel appears to have been spurred to found the prizes by the erroneous publication of a scathing obituary in a French newspaper years before his death. Nobel was a pacifist, and by the end of his life an extraordinarily wealthy one; his will designated his fortune to be used annually to reward “those who, during the preceding year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind”. An idealistic internationalist, Nobel was wise enough to specify that “no consideration whatever shall be given to the nationality of the candidates, but that the most worthy shall receive the prize, whether he be a Scandinavian or not”.3

A Nobel prize in the sciences has become undoubtedly the most prominent and prestigious honour in their respective fields, and the decisions are largely uncontroversial, since verified discoveries in the natural sciences for the most part take place ‘behind the back’ of politics, as it were. No such immunity is available to the peace prize, however; its purview is so ill-defined that almost anyone who has made a political splash in the international arena is up for it. On several occasions, organisations have won rather than individuals (most recently the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which shared the green-themed 2007 award with Al Gore).

Narrowing the field of prominent international statesmen and NGOs is a fishy business – and to a large extent dictated by the covert political priorities of the imperialist order, with a modicum of Scandinavian social democratic ‘critical distance’, of course. Obama is “humbled”, according to his acceptance speech, to share the prize with many of his icons – one wonders if he has in mind Henry Kissinger, who was honoured in 1973 for concluding the Paris peace accords over the Vietnam war. He was supposed to share it with North Vietnamese diplomat Le Duc Tho, but the latter turned it down: there was, he said, still no peace in his country.

He would have been within his rights to object simply to sharing any award with Kissinger. Taken on as an advisor to Richard Nixon and a legendarily cynical icon of cold war Realpolitik, Kissinger masterminded the ruthless bombing of Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam conflict, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths. He oversaw US support for brutal military coups, most infamously the overthrow of Chilean socialist Salvador Allende by Augusto Pinochet. Those two atrocities were accomplished or well underway by the time Kissinger became a Nobel laureate – and he has repeatedly advised US governments since on its shadier activities, most recently turning up in the George W Bush kitchen cabinet in the early days of the Iraq war.

Kissinger is only the most foul of a rogues’ gallery of Nobel peace laureates that includes Menachem Begin (former leader of the quasi-fascist Irgun Zionist militia, and later the first Likud prime minister of Israel), the last apartheid president of South Africa, FW de Klerk, and many other dubious figures.

And now Obama. Interestingly, however, this is not simply a piece of Atlanticist fawning. The timing of the award has been interpreted by some as a calculated snub to the outgoing US administration.4 There is some background to this, as well; in 2002, the grateful recipient was former US president Jimmy Carter, whose human rights offensive during his bungled tenure has blossomed into a life-long quest.

Though he can hardly be described as an anti-imperialist, the fact that a ‘progressive’ American political grandee should be awarded at a time when the US, under George W Bush, was very much on a war footing and clamping down on domestic dissent, raised a few questions. Gunnar Berge, head of the committee that year, confirmed suspicions: “With the position Carter has taken on [the coming war with Iraq], it can and must also be seen as criticism of the line the current US administration has taken …”5

So is this a ‘reward’ for Americans choosing to come in from the cold and embrace ‘multilateralism’, ‘peace’ and ‘human rights’, with Obama their gleaming-toothed avatar? Or is it simply a delayed Scandinavian ripple of the mass hysteria that greeted his election, nearly a year ago? In truth, it barely matters; it is difficult to decide which reflects more badly on the prize. Obama has three years to go, and plans to dive right into ‘solving’ the Iranian ‘problem’; we can also expect some further grossly undemocratic deals to be foisted on the Palestinians. By 2012 America could be at war with Iran and Israel-Palestine again the site of mass bloodshed. ‘Hostage to fortune’ does not quite cover it.

It would not be the first time the committee’s decisions have come to look a bit silly. Henry Kissinger has been mentioned; the Oslo accords occasioned a three-way award to Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, and here we are 15 years later, still waiting for peace.

Capitalism generates war; it relies on a system of competing states to function, and this competition necessarily spills over into armed struggle. It needs international transactions to be guaranteed and a military force to supply that guarantee, which means a global hegemon state (or bloc of states). Against this background, the Nobel Peace Prize can only ever be an expression of starry-eyed utopianism, befitting its bourgeois pacifist founder; between Kissinger and Obama, it has reduced itself to quixotic self-parody.

Notes

  1. badpaintingsofbarackobama.com
  2. nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html
  3. nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/will/will-full.html
  4. See, for example, New York Times October 9.
  5. archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/10/11/carter.nobel/index.html

New vision for Europe wanted

esu-flag-2James Turley argues that the bourgeoisie is incapable of uniting Europe on any secure basis

Ireland’s referendum on the European Union’s Lisbon treaty is surely the last major hurdle it will face.

The Irish parliament still needs to formalise ratification, and the presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic have also yet to sign. The latter’s, Vaclav Klaus, is a noted Eurosceptic, who controversially intervened in the first Irish referendum last November while on a state visit. Yet he will no doubt relent now that the Czech parliament has voted to endorse it, and Poland will quickly follow suit. The treaty will pass into effect.

For many on the nationalist left and far right, this is a disaster. The Lisbon treaty, it is said, not without foundation, is simply a repackaged version of the abortive EU constitution, rejected by French and Dutch referenda in 2005 – repackaged in such a way that recalcitrant populations would not get to vote on it (Ireland being the sole exception by virtue of a constitutional clause).

When it comes into force, the fear is that the treaty will expropriate more power from ‘accountable sovereign governments’ to a faceless bureaucracy in Brussels. The nationalist far right fears ‘economic freedom’ being drowned in red tape and society buckling under hordes of migrant workers; the nationalist left also fears unrestricted migrant workers, but additionally worries about the market being enshrined as the natural order of things, along with a whole new raft of anti-worker legislation and even the formalisation of a new imperialist pole.

In reality, Lisbon is a quantitative development for the EU rather than a qualitative one. It logically flows from its expansion, especially the accession of 10 new member-states in 2004, mostly former Stalinist countries. The EU remains a confederation rather than a federation: crucially the vast bulk of police and armed forces – which, in the last instance, enforce constitutional arrangements – remain in the hands of member-states.

Yet Eurosceptics are correct when they point to the almost laughably undemocratic manner in which EU governments have effectively forced these new arrangements on their populations. That this is necessary, and other factors in the fraught gestation of the treaty, highlight the broader historical contradictions in the European project – and call for an entirely different approach from the left than is currently on offer.

The first proto-EU was an unassuming thing – the European Coal and Steel Community was proposed to ensure cooperation between the respective steel industries of France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Its significance went beyond simple economic agreements, however – the ECSC was floated in 1950, its proposed members still reconstructing after the devastation of World War II. In pooling key military resources, argued French foreign minister Robert Schuman, France and West Germany would “make war not only unthinkable, but materially impossible”. When the treaty was signed in 1951, the two core nations were joined by the Benelux countries and Italy, creating a free trade zone for the eponymous commodities.

Cooperation between the six countries was steadily extended throughout the 50s, most significantly with the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European Economic Community customs union in 1957; this period also saw negotiations with other countries wishing to join, in particular Britain. Charles de Gaulle famously scuppered these moves with his use of the French veto, first in 1963 and then in 1967.

More significant than the memory of WWII, however, was the immediate context of the cold war. Stalin’s USSR acted quickly in the wake of the war to consolidate its new sphere of influence in eastern and central Europe, acquired during the long and bloody defeat of Nazi Germany on the eastern front. ‘Revolutions’ – in reality, for the most part, coups instigated by the Red Army alongside local ‘official communist’ parties – established authoritarian and Moscow-loyal regimes in all conquered territories. By 1948 the so-called communist bloc extended from the Soviet Union to East Germany.

Unsurprisingly, contemporaneous to the first economic treaties were parallel agreements over military cooperation. The North Atlantic Treaty, establishing the Nato military alliance, was supported by others which consolidated the ‘defence’ efforts of western Europe. Even the economic arrangements often had direct military applications – the ECSC, as we have noted, but also Euratom, which established cooperation in the development of nuclear power. Effective unity in the face of the ‘communist threat’ was paramount for European countries – in particular, given the still substantial colonial holdings of France and Britain, and the active involvement of Soviet-loyal communist parties in the wave of anti-colonial nationalism that threatened them.

Yet the reluctance of the likes of de Gaulle to countenance expansion is also understandable. Britain was seen as an American Trojan horse and military cooperation in Nato meant in reality subordination to the US. There was, and remains, no doubt as to who called the shots in Nato. De Gaulle – and the political trend bearing his name that shaped French politics in the post-war epoch – was keen to establish a degree of independence from this domineering ally, whose global interests frequently diverged from those of France, a country which still had grand imperial ambitions of its own.

These were the real stakes in Britain’s troubled entry into the original European Communities. Britain was (and remains) America’s closest ally in Europe. A British veto over EU policy is virtually the same as an American veto. In the 1970s and 80s, during the economic convulsions that sounded the death knell of the post-war Keynesian consensus, it was the UK that followed most decisively the American pattern of reconstructing the economy around finance capital, decimating its own industrial base (and, along with it, the workers’ movement). France and, in particular, Germany maintained their manufacturing capacity, and contradictions between the core powers of continental Europe and the Atlantic ‘special relationship’ grew.

This formed the backdrop to shifts in Britain’s own political culture; Euroscepticism, always lurking on the fringes, became a major force and source of internal ructions in the Conservative Party. John Major’s attempts to negotiate the 1992 Maastricht treaty were frequently interrupted by the protests of his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, whose opposition to the EU had surfaced towards the end of her reign. A fraught Commons vote almost caused the Tory government to collapse.

Today, the contradiction still surfaces frequently – see, for instance, the disputes over the economic crisis which have arrayed the French and German governments against their American and British counterparts. More fundamentally, it is expressed in differences over the direction the EU should take. It is in the interests of the US and Britain that the EU should expand to include more states, thus tying the core western European powers to a deadweight block of votes in the east that is largely pro-Washington.

A wider European Union is a less powerful competitor to US hegemony – as is one that does not consolidate power too centrally in transnational institutions. The French and German states, conversely, prefer a smaller but more tightly federated EU that can pursue a more independent course vis-à-vis the Americans.

This is the context in which debates on the left around the EU have to be placed. Marxists, as a rule of thumb, prefer the greatest possible unity between nations. Our cause is global – it transcends the artificial borders and barriers erected before us, which serve only capital. When Marx and Engels started their political careers, Germany was a nation but not a state – it was divided into squabbling princedoms, some tiny and some relatively powerful. They argued consistently for the ‘one and indivisible republic’, to unite the German states and with them the German masses. This was not out of any romantic, Volk nationalism, but in the interests ultimately of the unity of the workers across Europe.

In the EU, we are faced with a contradictory unity of disparate states – some (like Germany and Britain) relatively powerful, others weak. European unity is, on one level, being forced upon national populations who are often unsympathetic to it. On another level, however, the ruling class is pussyfooting. Unity can go only as far as it serves the interests of capital. Trade barriers can be scrapped, but individual member-states retain many powers of taxation, law-making and, of course, over their military machines. The interests of capital in general and the US in particular hold unity in Europe back.

The first political consequence for the left is that simple, unreconstructed opposition to the EU is a false, economistic position. It fails to acknowledge that the unity of nations is a progressive phenomenon that in the long run makes our tasks easier, and that we should seek to preserve and extend such unity where it is not travestied by national oppression.

The bourgeoisie is manifestly incapable of uniting Europe on any secure basis. Its lash-up treaties, agreed in conference rooms behind our backs, come with guaranteed unpopularity. The frequent declarations of intent on the part of British politicians to ‘make the case for Europe’ belie the fact that these people cannot make the case for Europe – that their vision of unity is not even really unity at all, but simply a rag-tag jumble of treaties in the service of capital.

Those who oppose this by counterposing ‘democratic’ national parliaments to EU administrators are also misconceived. It is simply not the case that an all-powerful Brussels bureaucracy is hoarding political power; the EU is run by the member-states for the member-states (some member-states being more equal than others). This fallacy reached a nadir of absurdity with the CPB-Bob Crow ‘No to the EU, Yes to Democracy’ platform in the June EU elections, which cited the malign influence of certain European court decisions on domestic workers’ struggles. The fact is that the strategy of the British state in Europe has been to zealously pull it in the direction of more brazen and ruthless bourgeois power.

Instead of retreating into nationalism, communists must outline our own vision for a united Europe – under the rule of the working class. Such an entity would provide a key bulwark against global imperialism and must be an essential element in any communist programme.

  • For a republican United States of Europe. Abolish the council of ministers and sack the unelected commissioners. For a fully democratic European parliament with recallable MEPs.
  • Nationalise all banks in the EU and put the European Central Bank under direct democratic control.
  • For the levelling up of wages, workers’ rights and social provisions.
  • No to moves towards EU militarisation. Yes to a popular, democratic militia.
  • No to Fortress Europe. For the free movement of people into the EU and between EU member-states.
  • For workers’ unity across Europe. For a single EU trade union confederation and a Communist Party of the European Union.